Naren Rajasingham’s Reading of Pirapāharan’s Thamilīlam in 2004/05

Michael Roberts

In working up perceptive readings of the Sri Lankan scenarios presented by the Tamil activist Narendran Rajasingham in Colombo Telegraph and other outlets I will proceed chronologically. This collection includes (B) his engagements with the Tamil peoples who survived the last stages of the war and ended up as internal refugees in IDP camps or elsewhere in 2009/10; (C) his discerning evaluations of the Tamil death toll; and (D) his forthright and critical reading of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Victory Day Speech of 13^th May 2013 in no less an outlet than Colombo Telegraph; and (E) some biting exchanges within Colombo Telegraph when he countered Tamil protagonists via ethnographic data and incisive contentions in clarification of the war and its aftermath.

One finding is a Word File which he sent me on 23 August 2010 with assessments of the political scenario within the state of Thamilīlam in late 2004/05 – an assessment gathered in the course of his short sojourn there with his brother Jayadevan Rajasingham.[1]

Narendran’s Evaluation of Pirapāharan and the LTTE on the Cusp of Their Demise in February 2009

Dr. Rajasingham Narendran, in Sri Lanka Guardian, 7 February 2009, where the title is “Rise and Fall of the LTTE – An Overview” …. with highlighting emphasis being impositions by The Editor, Thuppahi

Sri Lankan armed forces have almost ended the capacity of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) to engage in conventional war in the near future. They may also succeed in severely curtailing attempts by the LTTE to resort to sabotage, terrorism and socio-economic disruptions, subsequently. They have also recovered almost the entirety of the territory once held by the LTTE. These achievements, contrary to the expectations of many, have not only attracted the attention of the world, but also its implicit support. However, the plight of the 250,000 Tamil civilians, believed held by the LTTE in the jungles of Mullaitivu is weighing heavy on the world’s conscience. How the Sri Lankan government and armed forces will deal with the issue of these civilians, is being scrutinized closely by a concerned world and the Tamil-speaking people at large.

Clobbering Rajiv Gandhi as Chastisement in 1987: A Guti Dheema

Michael Roberts

When Vijithamuni Rohana de Silva upended military discipline and attempted to clobber the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on the head as the latter was inspecting a guard of honour on 30^th July 1987, he was indulging in an act of chastisement – a guti dheema in Sinhala parlance. As such, in my tendentious elaboration, Rohana de Silva was administering a medicinal pill in the vocabulary of archaic Sinhala – a vocabulary that has resonances within the term beheth guliya. [1]

The emphasis on guti dheema was a conjecture I presented way back in 2002.[2] In my reading now, one that Retd Commodore Somasiri Devendra does not share, the intricate details provided recently by Retd Lt KH Perera confirm this set of musings.

 Indo-Lanka Accord about to be signed on 29th July 1987

A Naval Rating’s Assault on Rajiv Gandhi, 30 July 1987: Detailed Account

Retd. Lt. KH Perera’s Account of the Background, Circumstances and Immediate Aftermath of the Assault on Rajiv Gandhi, on 30^th July 1987

Preamble:  Via mediation by Rtd Commodore Somasiri Devendra,[1] Michael Roberts visited Retd Lt. KH Perera’s house at Boralasgamuwa on Thursday 25^th July 2019 in the company of Devendra.  Retd Lt Perera responded readily to the questions presented about the attempt to clobber the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when he was inspecting a naval guard of honour gathered in front of the President’s House outside the Post Office in the Fort of Colombo on 30^th July 1987. As Master Chief Petty Officer, KH Perera was in command of the naval ratings mustered for this important state occasion. The details elicited during our discussion and compiled here with aid from Somasiri Devendra are of considerable importance and cannot be overestimated.

The Commanding Roles in the Last Phases of the Eelam War: A Few Thoughts

Retd Brigadier Hiran Halangode

Thanks, Michael for inviting me to comment on the remarks made by Mr. Gerald Peiris. I will only comment briefly on your observations to his two disagreements.  Some areas are classified because it involves the character of both Field Marshall SF and Gota and their role in winning the conflict over the LTTE, since their political ambitions may be affected in the future. The spheres of  political and military leadership were differentiated. The Navy, Air Force, Police, STF, and the Civil Defence Force were part of the military leadership, whilst MR, GR, Basil R and Lalith Wiratunga provided the political and civilian leadership.

Stephen Long’s ‘Revenge Politics’: Questionings

Michael Roberts

In a riveting article in Asian Tribune entitled “Sri Lanka: A Tragic Lesson in Revenge Politics,” Stephen Long has assessed Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s contribution to Sri Lanka’ victory during Eelam War IV in this style: “With the precision of a skilled strategist, Gotabhaya decisively defeated the LTTE. With limited resources, the military intelligence network he put together to keep track of the terrorists was second to none; he literally had the country “wired” for real-time information-collecting and feedback to authorities.”

CR de Silva’s Appraisal & Report on Amarasingam’s Study of Tamil Activists in Canada

Chandra R. de Silva:  “Report on Amarnath Amarasingam’s Pain, Pride and Politics: Sri Lankan Tamil Activism in Canada“ — being a Reader’s Confidential Review of a Book Mss sent in response toa request from the publishers …. a book that has since appeared in print as  under the imprint of the University of Georgia Press (2015)