Dishan Joseph, in Daily News, 29 June 2020, where the title is “A confluence of courage and stealth”
The Greek philosopher Aristotle has said, “You will never do anything in this world without courage.” Boldness is a vital attribute of a soldier. In the global military arena, most countries have an elite unit of Special Forces that represent the ultimate military warrior trained and forged with an indomitable will.
Filed under accountability, cultural transmission, education, historical interpretation, landscape wondrous, life stories, LTTE, military strategy, performance, power politics, self-reflexivity, sri lankan society, the imaginary and the real, unusual people, world events & processes
The SL Army’s Land Warfare Campaign in 2006-09: Debating the Lines of Strategic Emphasis
HALANGODE FOUR: Retd Brig. Hiran Halangode’s Clarification**
This account deals with the question of the re-organization of the Infantry Battalions and a gradual expansion of the SIOT concept since 2002.
I start with the raising of the Ceylon Army and its evolution up-to 1983 in brief. The Army was raised to defend Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity whilst the external threat was to be met by the British Forces deployed in Ceylon. Note our INTERNAL DEFENCE was primarily the Ceylon Army’s responsibility. Our Army’s primary tasks were to tackle the trade union and leftist agitations, strikes and work disruptions which affected our supply of essential services, distribution of food from the port and our daily life. Continue reading
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Cross posted at Thoughts on Military History , 24 September 2011, with this title “Fighting Power as the Arbiter of Leadership Effectiveness”
In an era of fourth generation warfare where the achievement of strategic end-goals lay squarely at the feet of politicians, the application of fighting power as a militaries core war fighting capability is being increasingly questioned with a concentration on Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Peacekeeping Support Operations (PSO). For example, Colonel Gian Gentile has lamented on the death of the US Armor Corps as the US Army moves to an infantry-centric force grounded in population centric COIN. This has left it, in Gentile’s opinion, unable to produce effective fighting power. This raises the important question of how fighting power is defined and how it affects of the study of leadership.
The SL Army’s Land Warfare Campaign in 2006-09: Debating the Lines of Strategic Emphasis TWO: Travis Sinniah’s Clarification
In a telephone conversation in June 2020 relating to the Sri Lankan armed forces successful military campaign on land against the formidable LTTE forces during Eelam War IV, issues arose regarding the lines of strategic emphasis. As I was not au fait with one of the summary terms mentioned in this chat, I formulated a ‘QUESTION’ which I sent to several personnel with a military background. In a deliberate presentational ‘tactic,’ I am placing the Memoranda I received in reply from Retd Admiral Travis Sinniah ahead of the Question I presented to him.
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